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Abstract
Assuming that teachers are concerned with human capital formation and stu-
dents  with ability signaling, in this paper we model a teacher-student relationship
as an agency problem with conicting interests. In our model, the teacher elicits
e¤ort from a student rewarding for it with a grade, the utility of which to the
student is the ability signal inferred by the job market. In the event that the job
market does not observe individual teachersgrading practices, teachers nd grades
as costless rewards and optimally choose to be lenient in grading. As a result,
the problem of the commonsof good grades emerges leading to the depreciation
of grading standards and grade ination. The prediction of the model that the
lower the expectations the teacher holds about her studentsabilities, the atter
the grading rules she sets up is empirically supported.
Keywords: Principal-agent model, teacher-student relationship, costless rewards,
grading rules, mismatch of abilities and grades, grade ination, teacher incentives.
JEL codes: C70, D82, D86, I20.
1 Introduction
Contrary to what is expected, grading criteria for assessing student performance are
invariant neither over time nor across universities or separate study elds. There is a
number of stylized facts about grading patterns documented in the literature on educa-
tional measurement, and in this paper we study two of them, arguably, most notable ones.
First, there is a tendency for grading standards to depreciate over time commonly known
as the grade inationphenomenon. Second, professors apply more stringent grading
criteria in elds with more able students, and vice versa, leading to a mismatch or low cor-
relation between studentsgrades and their abilities. (Empirical evidence is extensively
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discussed later in the text.) In addition, to take a more general stance, we discuss the
compression of ratings and leniency bias phenomena from the literature on performance
evaluation, which can be intricately linked to the two grading patterns above.
The main purpose of this paper is to rationalize the aforementioned grading patterns
from the perspective of an individual teacher, who looks for a grading rule to achieve the
benevolent objective of increasing student knowledge in her taught subject. The crux
of the arguments presented here is centered on particular aspects of grades as teacher
rewards for students: their costlessness and asymmetry in information about grading
rules applied. In our model, the grading rule optimally designed by a teacher and its
dynamics resultant from changes in distribution for student abilities and in perception of
grade value o¤er a good match to the grading patterns empirically observed. Though this
paper is mainly concerned with the positive analysis of optimal grading and its properties,
here we also discuss some normative aspects of the questions raised.
The approach of this paper is to consider a teacher-student relationship as a principal-
agent model with conicting interests: a teachers goal is to pass on knowledge to students,
who only care for the teachers assessment of their performance grades. A justication
of this conict of interests would be the dichotomy of the role of education: human capital
formation versus job market signaling.1 An interpretation of the modeling framework to
be presented is that a teacher is concerned with the human capital formation side, while a
student with the ability signal his or her accomplished education carries along, treating
knowledge obtained as abstract and useless outside academia.
In the model, the teacher (principal) o¤ers her students a contract, which is a
grading rule assigning grades to exam scores. It is assumed that the teacher has a
technology the exam test that allows her to assess her studentsknowledge levels at-
tained, on which she conditions grades to be rewarded. With the help of grades, which
cost nothing to reward, the teacher aims to elicit costly learning e¤ort from equivalently,
to pass on knowledge to her students, who come from a population of students with dis-
parate abilities for the subject taught. We assume that a knowledge level attained by a
student is in a direct and deterministic relationship with his learning e¤ort elicited (con-
ditional on his ability type). The main constraint that we impose on the teacher is that
her grading rule needs to be incentive compatible, i.e., a grade cannot be conditioned
on the students ability level, which is his private information (but the distribution for
abilities in population is known to the teacher).2 The crucial element of the model is the
value that students attach to the grades rewarded.
1See, e.g., Bedard (2001).
2If the hidden-information framework seems restrictive arguably, teachers have access to students
previous records and can learn about their abilities then, alternatively, we could require that the teacher
cannot discriminate among her students by applying ability-specic grading rules (i.e., the same exam
score has to result in the same grade irrespective of the students ability level). With this alternative
formulation, the optimization problem would remain intact as in the case with the hidden-information
framework adopted, and, therefore, the latter is retained for its link with the existing literature.
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We separately consider two sources of grade value for students: 1) nominal a grade
is of a value on its own and 2) relative the value of a grade comes in the form of an
ability signal inferred by the job market. The latter interpretation of grade value is in
the tradition of treating education as job market signaling (Spence (1973)). Under this
interpretation, we also distinguish between two situations i) the job market can observe
the grading rule applied by a teacher, and ii) the job market cannot observe the grading
rule applied and makes its inference about a students ability based on its own perception
of grading standards applied. In situation i), an individual teacher has to take into
account the e¤ect the stringency of her grading rule has on the grade value perceived by
students, whereas in situation ii) this e¤ect is absent, essentially making grades valued
by students nominally.
With the nominal interpretation of grade value, the key assumption embedded is that
in a given class of students an individual students utility of a grade is independent of
the (expected) distribution of grades in the class. We can think of several justications
of this assumption. Besides the one already suggested the ability-signaling value of a
grade is independent of the class distribution of grades when the job market does not
observe the grading rule applied another justication would be that students can be
ignorant about the ability distribution in the class or they are of bounded rationality
to discern the resultant grade distribution from the grading rule set up by the teacher.
Another rationale behind modeling grades nominally would be that a student may care
for his grade at every class he takes not just because of its immediate job-market-signaling
value but for its contribution toward his nal grade average, which later on will serve as
an ability signal. Finally, many external criteria of academic achievement, used for, e.g.,
scholarship application purposes, are usually assessed in nominal grades.
Therefore, in the case with the nominal value of grades where, to put it di¤erently,
there is no interdependence of (ex ante) utilities between any two students in a class
and, as a result of that, there is no scarcity of rewards, i.e., grades to give the teacher-
student model turns alike a single-agent (i.e., single-student) agency problem with hidden
information or a monopolistic screening problem. In particular, the teacher designs an
incentive-compatible grading rule to maximize the students expected knowledge, where
the student cares for his grade only. However, there is an important di¤erence with the
canonical monopolistic screening problem: in our model, the reward is costless to grant
but of a value to the student. In other words, in our model the transfer (grade) function
does not enter the teachers objective function but only the students, implying that
there is no intercomparison of utilities. In the case with the relative value of grades and
observable grading rules, where the teacher faces a scarcity of grades, the single-agent
framework still applies after modifying the students utility function of grades, as shown
later in the text.
In the static setting with a continuum of types, we obtain the following predictions
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about optimal grading patterns. In the event when students value grades nominally,
the teacher pools student ability types for the highest grade (of an institutionally preset
grading scale). This result arises because it cannot be optimal for the teacher to reserve
the highest grade to one ability type because of its small probability mass. By turning
more lenient with high-ability students, the teacher can extract more e¤ort from lower-
ability types, and this gain in e¤ort from lower types outweighs the corresponding loss
of e¤ort from the highest types (unlike in the standard model with costly transfers). In
other words and more generally, the no pooling at the topproperty does not hold when
the principal can costlessly reward the agent.
For the case with the relative value of grades, if the students learning costs are not
too high (in the model, the e¤ort cost function is not too convex), then, unlike in the
nominal-value case, the teachers optimal grading rule perfectly screens student ability
types.3 However, if the teachers grading rule is not observed by the job market, we again
obtain pooling student types for the highest grade but even at a larger scale than in the
nominal-value case. In addition to the reasons for pooling types discussed above, here we
also observe the deterioration of the job-market perception of grades as ability signals,
eventually leading to the depreciation of grade value for students and, as a result, to
teacherspooling types even further.
Next, our comparative statics analysis shows that in the model with nominal grades
if the teacher holds low expectations about her studentsabilities, then she should apply
more lenient grading rules (in order to elicit on average higher learning e¤ort), and vice
versa. This can lead to heterogeneous distributions of grades among classes di¤erent
in student abilities in particular, to a mismatch and low correlation between students
grades and their abilities.
Signicantly, the existing empirical evidence strongly supports the ndings of the
model, lending credibility to our chosen modeling strategy of a teacher-student relation-
ship. With regard to the comparative statics result, Goldman & Widawski (1976) report
a negative correlation between studentsScholastic Aptitude Test scores (which could be
seen as a proxy measure of studentsabilities) and the grading standards in the classes
the students were majoring in. According to this study (conducted at University of Cal-
ifornia, Riverside), the negative correlation observed is due to the fact that professors in
a eld consisting of students with high abilities tend to grade more stringently than do
professors in a eld with lower-ability students precisely as our model predicts. These
empirical ndings were conrmed by similar studies conducted at Dartmouth College
(Strenta & Elliott (1987)) and at Duke University (Johnson (2003)). With regard to the
pooling-at-the-top result, more generally, our model is consistent with the compression of
ratings and leniency bias phenomena about ratersshallow di¤erentiation of performance
3This result is in line with the results from related models modeling non-pecuniary rewards such as
status incentives; see Moldovanu et al. (2007), Besley & Ghatak (2008).
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and tendency to over-rely on the top end of the rating scale (see, Murphy & Cleveland
(1995)). Later in the text, we discuss empirical evidence more thoroughly.
If taken in a dynamic perspective, our model also o¤ers an insight into the grade
ination phenomenon an ongoing rise in grade point averages without an accompa-
nying rise in student ability or e¤ort.4Within the model, we can identify two factors
contributing to the grade ination. First, it is the change in the distribution for student
abilities toward the lower-ability end.5 According to our model, with larger numbers of
less able students in classes teachers set up less stringent grading rules, which translate
into higher average grades (and less study e¤ort6). As already mentioned before, the rea-
son for it is to extract more e¤ort from increasingly numerous lower-ability types (even
at the expense of further distorting incentives for high-ability types). The second factor
is about the opacity of grading practices or rules arising due to an increasing number
of university openings available.7 With the number of educational institutions increas-
ing, an individual teachers grading practice bears an increasingly smaller weight on the
job markets perception of grading standards. Then, similarly to the case with nominal
grades, teachers nd grades costless rewards to give and, therefore, tend to exploit good
grades to their benet (which is more student e¤ort). But when every teacher does so:
the problem of the commonsof good grades arises, which leads to the deterioration of
grading standards and grade ination in the end.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a note on related literature
about modeling grading rules, in Section 2 we present a modeling framework. In Section
3, we solve the model for the case when students value grades nominally, and in Section
4 for the case when students value grades relatively. In Section 5, we discuss the main
ndings of the model presented and relate them to the grading patterns observed in
practice; there, we also discuss policy applications of the model. In Section 6, we review
existing empirical evidence on mismatch between studentsgrades and their abilities. The
last section concludes the study.
4Dickson (1984). For more on grade ination, see, e.g., Sabot & Wakeman-Linn (1991) or Kuh &
Hu (1999) and other references cited therein. The idea that more student e¤ort could be behind higher
average grades is also rejected by Babcock & Marks (2010), where they show that over the period
19612003 time spent for study by full-time students in the US gradually decreased from 40 to 27 hours.
5 ... which is consistent with the observation of declining college entrance test scores (Wilson (1999))
and the steadily increasing number of students enrolled in US degree-granting institutions both in ab-
solute and relative (as a percentage of high school graduates) numbers: see Table 200. Recent high
school completers and their enrollment in college, by sex: 1960 through 2008 of 2009 Digest of Education
Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_188.asp.
6 ... as documented in Babcock & Marks (2010).
7The number of degree-granting institutions in the US gradually increased from 563 in 18691870
to 4352 in 20072008, see Table 188. Historical summary of faculty, students, degrees, and nances
in degree-granting institutions: Selected years, 1869-70 through 2007-08 of 2009 Digest of Education
Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_188.asp.
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Literature
The modeling approach of a teacher-student relationship undertaken in this paper is novel
in economics literature, but it does not stand alone in taking the perspective of a principal-
agent model to study the question of optimal grading rules.8 Dubey &Geanakoplos (2010)
target the question what grading scale (ner or coarser) a teacher should use in order to
induce a higher e¤ort from her students. They approach the problem of optimal grading
schemes from a perspective di¤erent from ours: they model a teacher-student relationship
as a game of status with stochastic output similar to a tournament. In their multiple-
agent model, a students utility of a grade depends on his or her class ranking, i.e., status,
resulting from the grade rewarded (but not on the grade per se even if it carries the same
ability signal irrespective of the distribution of grades in the class). In addition, in their
model the teacher aims to incentivize all her students to put in maximal e¤ort rather
than to obtain the highest expected e¤ort. Given these modeling di¤erences, we draw
di¤erent conclusions about optimal grading schemes. Dubey & Geanakoplos (2010) nd
that teachers should use coarse grading schemes and pyramidthe allocation of grades:
in equilibrium the highest grade would be available to fewer students than the second-
highest grade, and so on.9 Our model predicts that teachers should apply coarse grading
schemes, but only when they can costlesslyreward the student (e.g., when an individual
teachers grading practice cannot a¤ect the perception of the job market about the value
of grades), otherwise they should apply a ne grading rule. In addition, in the case with
nominal grades, we do not nd pyramidingto be an optimal grading rule, especially,
when there is a large mass of less able students in the class.
Another strand of literature considers grades as cheap talk between university admin-
istration and the job market about student abilities (Chan et al. (2007), Ostrovsky &
Schwarz (2010)). The objective of university administration is to achieve higher average
job placements for their students. As shown in Ostrovsky & Schwarz (2010), university
administration may nd it benecial to compress information sent to the job market by
coarsening grading schemes. Chan et al. (2007) shows how competition among schools
can further worsen the problem of compressed grades resulting in the grade ination.
Even though in our paper the cheap-talk element of grades is not present: a teachers
and the job markets interests are orthogonal to one another; it could be, however, an
interesting extension to our model, as discussed later in the text.
8However, it needs to be reckoned that not much theoretical work has been done on modeling a
teacher-student relationship as a principal-agent model on its own: it has rather been modeled as part
of a larger setting involving potential employers or university administration, see McKenzie & Tullock
(1981, Ch. 17) for general discussion or recent papers Chan et al. (2007) and Ostrovsky & Schwarz
(2010), discussed below.
9Moldovanu et al. (2007), a study on contests for status rewards, makes a similar prediction as well.
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2 Framework
There is a teacher teaching her class of students a particular subject. The teachers goal
is to pass on knowledge in her subject to the students. She has a technology the exam
test that allows her to assess the knowledge level attained by a student from his test
score x 2 [0; x]. (The upper bound on test scores, x, is large enough to allow for an
interior solution.) We assume that the teachers technology is perfect in the sense that
there is a deterministic and direct relationship between test scores and knowledge levels,
both of which, therefore, are used synonymously throughout. Achieving a test score x
comes to a student at an e¤ort cost of C(x; ), where parameter  is the students privately
known ability level for the subject studied, distributed in the population according to a
common prior distribution F over the ability space  =

; 

,  >  > 0. The properties
of the e¤ort cost function C are Cx > 0; Cxx > 0; C < 0, and Cx < 0.
Suppose that students select the teachers class for exogenous reasons (e.g., the class is
compulsory in their curriculum).10 The reward pursued by every student is the teachers
assessment grade r 2 [0; r] of his class performance, i.e., knowledge attained. The
upper bound on grades, r, is assumed to be institutionally preset, as is the very grading
framework: the assessment of student performance needs to done in the form of grades
only.
As already said in the introduction, we separately consider two sources of grade value
for students: 1) a grade is of a value on its own (Section 3. Nominal Value of Grades) and
2) the value of a grade comes in the form of an ability signal inferred by the job market
(Section 4. Relative Value of Grades). The exact forms of the student utility functions
of grades are given in the corresponding sections.
The teacher and students relationship develops as follows. First, the teacher sets
up a grading rule that assigns grades r to test scores x. Then, after observing the
grading rule, each student decides on a learning e¤ort C(x; ) to achieve the test score
x rewarding the grade r. The teachers objective is to maximize her expected utility,
which increases in students knowledge levels equivalently, in their test scores and
every students objective is to maximize his utility of a grade less the e¤ort cost spent to
obtain it.
Here, we impose some further structure on the model. The cumulative ability distri-
bution function F is twice di¤erentiable and its probability density function f is strictly
positive everywhere (f > 0). In addition, we impose the assumption that the hazard rate,
h() = f()=(1   F ()), monotonically increases in ability, i.e., h0()  0. The student
10Arcidiacono (2004) argues that students select their majors out of intrinsic preference for them, for
which he provides empirical evidence showing that expected future earnings do not explain students
school and major choices. At the same time, Sabot & Wakeman-Linn (1991) empirically show that
studentschoice of classes not required for their majors is responsive to their grade expectations, which
we do not model here essentially restricting attention to the choice of classes in studentsmajor.
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e¤ort cost function C is separable in test score x and ability  and takes the form of
C(x; ) =
y(x)

;
where y is an increasing and strictly convex function of x. Then, denote the teachers
utility of test score x elicited from a student by function V : [0; x] ! R+, Vx > 0, and
assume, until further notice, that it is linear in x :
V (x) = x: (1)
The teachers linear utility can be interpreted that she equally cares about low- and high-
ability studentsperformance. Later in the text, when discussing policy applications of
the model, the linear case serves as a benchmark for the cases when 1) function V is
convex (the teacher puts more weight on high-ability students), and 2) function V is
concave (the teacher puts more weight on low-ability students).
3 Nominal Value of Grades
In this section, we model that students value grades at their face value and derive a higher
utility from a higher grade independently of the grading rule applied by the teacher. As
already discussed in the introduction, this assumption allows us to treat the teachers
problem of designing grading rules as a single-student agency problem.
Next, when formulating the teachers utility maximization problem designing the
student-knowledge-maximizing grading rule we, without loss of generality, restrict the
set of grading rules to direct grading rules fx; rg, where test score schedule x : ! [0; x]
and grade schedule r :  ! [0; r] belong to the class of piecewise continuously di¤eren-
tiable functions, denoted by C1x and C1r , respectively. Furthermore, from the Revelation
Principle we know that an optimal grading rule fx; rg needs to impose on the student
the truthful revelation of own ability type.
Given a grading rule fx; rg, the students net utility of reporting a type ^ is equal to
U(; ^) = r(^)  y(x(^))

; (2)
where parameter  is his true ability type. The students reservation utility of participat-
ing in the class is normalized to zero (for all ability types).
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3.1 The Teachers Problem
The teacher maximizes with respect to a grading rule fx; rg 2 C1xC1r her expected utilityZ 

x()dF () (3)
subject to
U(; )  U(; ^); (4)
U(; )  0; (5)
0 < r()  r; for all  and ^ in : (6)
In the above, (4) is the students incentive compatibility constraint, (5)  individual
rationality constraint, where the utility function U is dened in (2); the last constraint
imposes an upper bound on the teachers rewards (though already imposed by requiring
r 2 C1r ).
Under this specication, the model resembles a standard static principal-agent model
with hidden information (monopolistic screening problem) except for the transfer struc-
ture. The distinct feature of this model is that, unlike in most agency models, the transfer
function r does not enter the principals (teachers) utility function but only the agents
(students), meaning that the principal does not payto motivate the agent. In other
words, rewards are costless for the principal to give but of a value to the agent.
Therefore, unlike in models with monetary transfers, in this model with costless re-
wards we do not have the intercomparison of the agents and principals utilities. To solve
the model, we approach it di¤erently from the standard solution method attributable to
Mirrlees (1971), which main idea is to obtain a functional equation with one unknown by
merging the agents and principals optimization problems through the transfer function.
The key element in solving our model is the observation that it must be optimal for the
principal to reward the highest grade of r to the most e¢ cient agent, i.e., in the solution
we have r() = r because the reward is costless. This observation allows us to reduce all
the constraints (4)(6) into a single constraint and solve the model using the standard
Langragean methods.
The proposed renement that, unlike the agent, the principal is indi¤erent to a trans-
fer between them is by no means new in the contract theory literature. It was studied
in Guesnerie & La¤ont (1984), which provides an all-encompassing solution to a broadly
dened principal-agent problem. In particular, they distinguish between type Aand
type Bpreferences, where with the former preferences the principals utility does not
depend on a transfer, while with the latter (conventional) preferences it does. In their
study, however, the type Apreferences are primarily used to analyze a social planners
problem of social welfare maximization. There, a transfer between the social planner
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(principal) and the agent is equivalent, guratively speaking, to distributing money be-
tween two pockets of the same jacket, leaving the social welfare intact. Therefore, the
framework of Guesnerie & La¤ont (1984) does not apply to the problem studied here. In
our model, the principal is, in fact, more of type B, i.e., she cares only about her own
utility but does not pay for motivating the agent.
Furthermore, the problem stated here closely connotes with the textbook problem of
pricing a single indivisible object, to which a seller attaches no value (see, e.g., Krishna
(2002)). The sellers objective is to maximize her expected revenue received from selling
the object to a single buyer. Then, in the language of the price-setting framework, in
our problem (3)(6) the function x reads like a payment schedule, r  a probability
schedule of selling the object (with the upper bound set at r = 1, respectively). An
important di¤erence between our model and the pricing model in the way it is normally
approached is that in our model a score allocation x enters the agents utility function in
a nonlinear way, whereas in the other model it enters linearly. As such, if applied to the
pricing-setting problem, with some adjustments of the agents utility function our model,
as we are going to see next, would render that the seller can o¤er the object to some
agent types with a positive probability below 1, unlike in the pricing model with linear
utilities.
3.2 Solution
We present the solution, the grading rule fx; rg maximizing (3) subject to (4)(6), in
Proposition 1 below, relegating the details of solving the model to the Appendix. The
main property of the solution is the pooling of ability types from a non-empty interval
; 

for the highest score-grade allocation, which we discuss more thoroughly later.
Proposition 1 The score-grade allocations (x(); r()), solving the optimization problem
(3)(6), are characterized
 for ability types  in [; ), where
 = minf : (1  F ())=(f())  1;  2 ; g; (7)
by
x() = y 1x

f()2yx(x(
))
f()2

(8)
for the score allocations x, and by
r() =
y(x())

+
Z 

y(x(~))
~
2 d
~ (9)
for the grade allocations r; and
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 for ability types  in ;  by the grade r() = r and the score allocation x() =
x(), where x() is found from
r   y(x(
))
2
 
Z 

y(x())
2
d = 0: (10)
Proof. See Appendix A.11
E¢ ciency
In this model with complete information, the rst-best grading rule is determined by the
students participation constraints only. Since the rewards are costless and the teachers
utility increases in score x, the teacher would set up a grading rule that gives the highest
grade of r to every student type against the e¤ort level determined by the corresponding
participation constraint. From the solution presented in Proposition 1, we can immedi-
ately see that the e¢ cient score levels can only be achieved for the lowest type in the
event when the teacher pools all the types, i.e.,  in (7) is equal to . In particular, the
no distortion at the topproperty, observed in the standard model, never holds here.
3.3 Results
Below we summarize the main properties of the optimal grading rule with nominal grades,
presented in Proposition 1.
Pooling at the top
To make it general, one of the main properties of the model studied is the optimality of
a uniform allocation among most e¢ cient agent types when the principal does not bear
or does not internalize the cost of rewarding the agent. This result is in contrast to the
no distortion at the topproperty of optimal contracts obtained in most agency models
with costly rewards and hidden information.12
Result 1 In a single-agent and hidden-information agency problem with costless rewards
and a continuum of types, the principal pools some of the most e¢ cient agent types for a
uniform allocation.
11For convenience, we assume that the teacher always nds it optimal to o¤er non-zero allocations to
all the student types. Also, the problem is solved for the case with the linear utility function V . However,
this has no e¤ect on the qualitative properties of the solution obtained, which are invariant to the form
of the teachers utility function V (which needs to be less convexthan the e¤ort cost function C). In
particular, the starting point of the pooling interval  remains the same for any functional form of V .
12While the no distortion at the topproperty is characteristic of principal-agent models with mon-
etary rewards, see, e.g., Mirrlees (1971), it has also been shown to hold for agency problems with status
incentives, see Moldovanu et al. (2007). But recently, there have also been papers in which this property
does not hold in the optimum, see Levin (2003) or MacLeod (2003), where the result hinges on the
assumption that the agents e¤ort is not veriable unlike in our model.
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The proof of this result has been given when deriving the condition for the starting
point of the pooling interval (7) in Proposition 1 (see Appendix A), where we show that
a uniform score-grade allocation (x(); r) applies to all the agent types from the non-
empty interval

; 

(the starting point  is bound to be strictly less than the highest
ability type , since (1   F ())=(f()) = 0 < 1). Moreover, neither the existence of
an upper bound on rewards nor its size, as imposed by constraint (6), is central to the
result, what is crucial is the costlessness of rewards. (In a principal-agent model with
costly rewards, imposing an upper bound on a reward function does not lead to pooling
among most e¢ cient agent types as long as this constraint is not binding, i.e., when the
upper bound is large enough.)
The nding that there is no perfect screening among the most e¢ cient agent types
should not be surprising. Suppose it were the case that in the solution only the most
e¢ cient type received the highest reward. To make this allocation incentive compatible,
the principal would need to suppress the motivation of other types in order to refrain the
most e¢ cient type from misreporting. But, as an alternative to the perfect screening,
consider the principal marginally tilting up the schedule of all the allocations but
the last one done at no cost against the corresponding decrease in the performance
allocation of the most e¢ cient agent type. This change in the allocations is sure to be
expected performance increasing because the gain from it the increases in performance
levels for almost all types outweighs its corresponding loss the decrease in performance
level of the most e¢ cient type happening with a very small probability. As a result, the
principal nds it optimal to increase the probability mass of agent types subject to the
highest reward until the gains and losses described o¤set each other.
Referring back to the teacher-student relationship, where lenient grading is a wide-
spread phenomenon, pooling most e¢ cient types is even more prevalent when the distri-
bution for abilities is more skewed to the end of low types as discussed next.
Mismatch between grades and abilities
Here, we establish a relationship between the optimal grading rule and student ability
distribution, which has a strong empirical support from the literature on educational
measurement, described later in the paper.
Consider two classes of students, who come from two di¤erent student populations,
where abilities are distributed on the same support  according to distributions F1 and
F2, respectively. Denote the student types from the two classes by 1 and 2, respectively,
and let the student type 2 be smaller than 1 in the likelihood ratio order, i.e.,
f2()
f1()
decreases for all  in ,
where f1 and f2 are the probability density functions of the corresponding distributions.
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The interpretation of this stochastic dominance condition is that students from the rst
class are held more able than those from the second class. (Formally, this condition
implies that
R 00
0 f1()d 
R 00
0 f2()d for any interval [
0; 00]  ; in words, for any
restriction of the ability space the expected student ability in the rst class is greater
than that in the second class.)
Let fx1; r1g and fx2; r2g be the solutions to the optimization problem (3)(6) for the
two classes, respectively. Then, the following holds.
Result 2 If the student type 2 is smaller than the student type 1 in the likelihood ratio
order, then the optimal grade allocations in the two classes satisfy r2()  r1() for every
student type  in .
Proof. See Appendix B.
To put it in words, this result says that the lower the expectations the teacher holds
about her student abilities, the more lenient she should be when grading. The intuition
behind the optimality of more lenient grading rules in less able classes comes from the
teachers attempt to extract more e¤ort from more numerous lower-ability student types,
and vice versa.
Results 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1. It depicts the optimal grading rules for
two classes with student ability type space  = [0:5; 1:5]; the student ability in the rst
class, 1, is distributed according to the distribution with f1() = ,  2 , and in the
second class, the student ability 2 is distributed uniformly over  (the top diagram, the
dashed line for the rst class and the dotted line for the second class). The e¤ort cost
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function takes the form of C(x; ) = x2=(2) and the upper bound on grades is set to
r = 1. The middle diagram of Figure 1 shows the optimal score allocations, and the
bottom diagram shows the optimal grade allocations for the two classes, respectively. As
we can see, both teachers pool some of the most e¢ cient student types. The teacher of
the rst class, however, o¤ers the highest grade of r to fewer student types but against
a higher performance level, while the teacher of the second class optimally chooses to be
more lenient. Unlike the teacher of the more able class, the second teacher also o¤ers
a atter score-grade schedule in her attempt to extract more e¤ort from less able but
relatively more numerous student types.
4 Relative Grades
In this section, we study the situation when students value grades only as ability signals to
the job market. Essentially, we close the model of Section 3 by introducing the job market,
which denes the value of a grade. In what follows, we distinguish between two cases based
on the scope of the job markets knowledge: 1) observable grading rules the job market
observes the exact grading rule applied to grade students and 2) unobservable grading
rules the job market does not observe the grading rule applied and infers a students
expected ability from his grade based on its own perception of grading standards used by
teachers.
4.1 Observable Grading Rules
Here, we modify the previous model by having that 1) the student values grades as
ability signals, and 2) the job market observes the grading rule set up by the teacher
and correctly infers the students (expected) ability from his grade, as dened below.
Therefore, unlike in the previous section, here the value of a grade is dependent on the
distribution of grades across di¤erent ability types or, in other words, on the stringency
of the grading rule applied by the teacher.
Suppose the teacher designs an incentive compatible grading rule fx; rg. Let R(r)
denote the range of the grade schedule r. If r 2 R(r), r 1(r) is the set of all  2  such
that r() = r. Let (r) = inf(r 1(r)) and 
(r) = sup(r 1(r)) denote the lowest and
highest types (at the limit) subject to the same grade r. Using the monotonicity of the
grade schedule r, we dene the ability type r : [0; r] ! , inferred by the job market
from a grade r, by
r(r) =
8>><>>:
r 1(r) if r 2 R(r) and (r) = (r);R (r)
(r) f()d()
F ((r)) F ((r)) if r 2 R(r) and (r) 6= (r);
0 if r =2 R(r).
(11)
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As a technical detail, we set r(r) = 0 if r =2 R(r) to mean that if a students grade is
outside the range of the grading rule applied then this grade as a signal is meaningless
(i.e., the job market infers that the student has no ability in the subject in question).
The above denition also denes a -type students utility of a grade given a grading
rule fx; rg, and his net utility of reporting a type ^ is equal to
U r(; ^) = r(r(^))  C(x(^); ): (12)
The teachers problem
As before, the teachers problem is to set up a grading rule that elicits from the student
the highest expected performance on the test, i.e., the teacher maximizes her expected
utility with respect to a grading rule fx; rg 2 C1x  C1rZ 

x()dF () (13)
subject to
U r(; )  U r(; ^); (14)
U r(; )  0; for all  and ^ in . (15)
In the above, the constraints are the students incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints, respectively, where the students utility function U r is dened in
(12).
In this version of the model, we can simplify the teachers problem (13)(15) by
making it be maximized with respect to a score schedule x only. The reason for this
is that a grade does not bear any value on its own and, as a result, a score schedule x
can be implemented by any grade schedule r isomorphic to x achieving the same utility
levels. Therefore, without loss of generality, in the teachers problem we restrict the set
of grading rules C1x  C1r to such grading rules fx; rg, where the grade schedule r takes
the form of
r() = r
x()
x()
; for any  2 : (16)
All in all, the teacher maximizes (13) with respect to x 2 C1x subject to (14) and (15)
with the grade schedule r imposed by (16).
Solution
If the student values a grade for its ability signal, the teacher, when designing a grading
rule, needs to take into account the e¤ect the grading rule itself has on the value of a
grade for the student as determined by (11). Unlike in the previous model with nominal
15
grades, it follows that the more lenient the grading rule the teacher sets up, the lower the
utility the student gets from a given grade, adversely a¤ecting his learning e¤ort choice
decision. Below, we give the condition when this downside e¤ect of leniency in grading
the job markets degrading of students grades outweighs the upside e¤ect more
e¤ort extraction from lower ability types.
First, we solve for the optimal score schedule x under the conjecture that the teacher
perfectly screens all the types.
Conjecture 1 The grading rule fx; rg solving the teachers problem (13)(16) screens
every ability type  distinctly.
Among strictly monotone score functions x 2 C1x, the solution to the teachers problem
is uniquely characterized by the students constraints (14) and (15) only. In the solution
x, the utility to the student of ability  from reporting being a type ^ is given by
U r(; ^) = ^   y(x(^))

;
and, at a point of di¤erentiability, the incentive compatibility constraint implies that
@
@^
U r(; ) = 0;
or
yx(x())x() = :
Next, it has to be that the individual rationality constraint of the lowest ability type 
needs to be binding (or, more precisely, that of the least e¢ cient type contracted upon
by the teacher, which we assume to be ). If there are no discontinuities which we check
if it is the case later the solution to the above di¤erential equation together with the
binding individual rationality constraint is
x() = y 1

2 + 2
2

; (17)
for every  in . Since the derivative of x in (17) is positive for every type , the condition
that x be strictly monotone holds.
But suppose that there are (simple) discontinuities in the score schedule x that solve
the teachers problem. Denote the discontinuity point closest to the type  by 0, and
let x(0 ) 6= x(0), where x(0 ) is the left-hand limit (the subsequent argument with
straightforward alterations also holds for the case x(0+) = x(0), where x(0+) is the
right-hand limit). Then, (17) holds only for types  in [; 0). But the allocation x(0)
cannot be greater than the allocation determined by (17) for  = 0, because x(0) would
not be incentive compatible: we could nd a type ~ 2 [; 0) such that U r(0; ^) > U r(0; 0)
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for every ^ 2 (~; 0). Then, x(0) should be smaller than the allocation determined by
(17) for  = 0, which, though, is suboptimal from the teachers perspective. Hence, there
cannot exist a discontinuity at 0, nor at any other point for the same reason.
Therefore, under the conjecture that all types are screened perfectly, (17) uniquely
characterizes the optimal score schedule x for every  in . Next, we need to give a
condition when this conjecture is valid. It turns out that the su¢ cient condition is the
convexity of the score schedule x in (17).
Proposition 2 If the score schedule x dened in (17) is convex, then it is the solution
to the teachers problem (13)(15) with the grade schedule r imposed by (16).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The idea of the proof is that, once the convexity condition is met, a grading rule
containing a uniform allocation for some types can be improved upon by separating
those types with distinct (and incentive-compatible) allocations as in (17). Furthermore,
the convexity condition is equivalent to requiring that the marginal disutility from e¤ort
under x as in (17) decrease in ability
@
@
(Cx(x(); )) < 0 (18)
or, under the functional assumption of C(x; ) = y(x)= and dropping the arguments,
yxx 
yx

2
;
which is to require that the e¤ort cost function be not too convex in scores x. (For
instance, this condition is met for the e¤ort cost function quadratic in x and, correspond-
ingly, for other cost functions less convexthan the quadratic one).
However, if the score schedule x dened in (17) is not convex everywhere, then at
the restrictions of the type space  where it is concave, we obtain pooling of types (by
reversing the argument of the proof of Proposition 2). Moreover, with a general form
of the teachers utility function V in (1) the condition for screening types is that the
function
V

y 1

2 + 2
2

is convex in . With a concave (convex) utility function V , this condition is less (more)
likely to hold.
Given that the convexity condition holds, the nding that the teacher screens all
the student types when the student values grades for their signaling value and the
job market can observe the grading rule designed is in stark contrast to the results
obtained for the case with nominal grades, where pooling of most e¢ cient types is always
optimal (see Result 1 of the previous section). This di¤erence in the optimal grading
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rules results from the di¤erence in the utility of a grade perceived by the student in the
two models studied. However, as we show next, if the job market cannot observe grading
rules designed by individual teachers and, correspondingly, relate a students grade to
the grading rule applied to grade him, then we again observe coarse grading rules with
pooling types even if the student values a grade for its signaling value only.
4.2 Unobservable Grading Rules
Here, we study the situation when the job market does not observe the grading rule that
the teacher has designed to grade her student. (This can happen, for instance, when there
are too many teachers for the job market to distinguish among.) Instead, we assume that
the job market holds its own perception of the grading standard applied, which we denote
by  2 C1r , and the students expected ability it infers from a grade r is, accordingly, (r)
dened by (11) for the grading standard  (i.e., in denition [11] r is replaced with ).
The ability inferred, (r), also denes the students value of a grade r. The assumption
is that the grading standard  is public information.
Now, the teachers problem is to design a grading rule fx; rg 2 C1x  C1r such that it
maximizes her expected utility against the grading standard 
Z 

x()dF () (19)
subject to
(r())  C(x(); )  (r(^))  C(x(^); ); (20)
(r())  C(x(); )  0; for all  and ^ in . (21)
Unlike in the previous problem (13)(15), here the teacher does not internalize the
e¤ect her grading rule has on the students utility of a grade, , which is determined
by the job markets grading standard . Therefore, the teacher nds grades costless to
reward. In this respect, the problem turns similar to the one with nominal grades (3)(6),
and, therefore, the solution method, applied in Appendix A when solving the model with
nominal grades, applies here, too.
In what follows, we are interested in the consistent grading standard , which needs
to be equal to the grading schedule r solving the teachers problem (19)(21) against the
grading standard .
Consistent grading standard
We make the following denitions.
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Denition 1 Let a mapping  : C1r ! C1r map a grading standard  into the grade
schedule r of the grading rule solving the teachers problem (19)(21) against the grading
standard .
For analytical convenience, we assume that for any  there is a unique solution to the
teachers problem and, accordingly, a unique grade schedule r.
Denition 2 A grading standard  is consistent if it is a xed point of the mapping :
 = ():
In words, a grading standard  is consistent if the grade schedule r of the teachers
optimal grading rule against the grading standard  is equal to the grading standard 
itself.
We can immediately establish the following property of a consistent grading standard.
Result 3 A grading standard  with perfect screening of ability types cannot be consistent.
This result is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 (and Result 1), where we show
that in a model with costless rewards pooling of types is inevitable. In the event that the
job market perceives a grading standard  that all student types are screened perfectly,
i.e., (1) > (2) if 1 > 2; 1; 2 2 , the teachers problem (19)(21) becomes
similar to that with nominal grades (3)(6), where the teacher can reward the student
with any ability signal  by manipulating the grade schedule r. More precisely, we can
make the following identity transformations of (19)(21) to make it look like (3)(6): set
()  (r()) and introduce a constraint   ()   for all  2 . Then, the teacher
maximizes her expected utility with respect to fx;g, and the optimal signal schedule 
would pool types  in [; ], where  dened by (7) in Proposition 1, for the reward of
, implying that the grading standard  cannot be consistent.
Change in grading standards
In the following subsection, we establish the existence result of a consistent grading
standard. Here, we attempt to analyze iteratively the dynamics of grading standards
under the adaptive expectations framework, in particular, to see the direction of change
of the interval of ability types pooled for the highest grade (more precisely, for the highest
ability signal inferred by the job market).
Suppose the initial grading standard 0 2 C1r is given and let it be a strictly increasing
function of  with 0() = r (i.e., the job market initially perceives that the teacher screens
every student type). The resultant grade schedule r0, maximizing the teachers utility
against the grading standard 0, is given by r0 = (0). Suppose a grade schedule ri 1;
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i  1, is given. We impose that the job market adjusts its perception of grading standards
by adapting the existing grade schedule as its new grading standard, i.e., i = ri 1, i  1.
Consider the grade schedule r0. It has the properties described in Proposition 1:
pooling types in [0; ], where 0 =  of Proposition 1, and screening the rest of types
(assuming that 0 >  and that the teacher o¤ers non-zero allocations to all the types).
Then, at iteration i = 1, the grading standard newly perceived by the job market is
1 = r0, which takes the form of
1() =
(
r if   0;
r0() otherwise.
The highest reward that the teacher can o¤er to the student against the grading standard
1 is 
1(r), where 1 is the (discontinuous) ability signal function dened by (11). Note
that the highest reward 1(r) has depreciated compared with the highest reward available
under 0 and the range of rewards has contracted under 1, respectively.
Next, consider the grade schedule r1 = (1) that the teacher sets up against the
grading standard 1. Following the solution steps in Appendix A, one can show that the
starting point 1 of the pooling interval [1; ] of the grade schedule r1, when 
1 > , is
characterized by
1  F (1)
1f(1)
=
yx(x1(
1))
yx(sup<<1 x1())
;
where the score allocation x1(
1) is for the types in the pooled interval [1; ], x1() are
the score allocations for types  2 [; 1), and sup<<1 x1() is the supremum of score
allocations x1() for types  to the left from 
1. Since in the teachers optimum we have
sup<<1 x1() < x1(
1) because of the discontinuous grading standard 1, the right-
hand side of the above expression is greater than 1 implying that the starting point 1of
the new pooling interval is smaller than 0.
Hence, the pooling interval further expands with the range of rewards ability signals
contracting again. As a result, at the next iteration with 2 = r1 a teacher nds herself
with fewer rewards at her disposal to give her students, arguably, leading to her further
coarsening the grading schedule and the gradual depreciation of grading standards. How-
ever, to analyze tractably further change in pooling intervals [i; ], i  2, or to see if
the sequence of pooling-interval starting points fig is convergent requires placing more
structure on the model (e.g., to have a complete metric space for grading rules and, then,
argue that the mapping  is a contraction in attempt to apply the contraction principle).
We take a di¤erent route to show the existence of a consistent grading standard, discussed
in the following subsection, and here, based on the analysis above, we state the following
result.
Result 4 If a grading standard  is consistent, then it is the case that the job market
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perceives types  in [; ] pooled for the highest reward, where    = minf :
(1  F ())=(f())  1;  2 ; g with the strict inequality if  > .
In words, in the case with unobservable grading rules a consistent grading standard ex-
hibits even more pooling among the highest student types than does the grading schedule
r, characterized in Proposition 1 for the case with nominal grades.
Existence of consistent grading standards
Here, we show that there exists a consistent grading standard  a xed point of .
Consider a step grading standard  such that
() =
(
r if   #;
r otherwise,
(22)
where r > r. It says that the job market perceives that student types greater than or
equal to some # 2  get the grade r, others the grade r. (The argument that follows
can be straightforwardly extended for any step grading standard with a nite number
of steps.) Given a step grading standard  as in (22), the teacher becomes restricted to
designing step grading rules fx; rg of the form
x() =
(
x if   0;
x otherwise,
and r() =
(
r if   0;
r otherwise,
where the teachers choice variables are scores x, x and threshold type 
0. The question
is if there is a step grading standard  with a threshold type # such that the threshold
type 0 of the step grading rule fx; rg above solving (19)(21) is equal to the threshold
type # of the grading standard .
For a given threshold type 0, the optimal score levels x and x can be expressed
as the continuous functions of 0 from the binding IR and IC constraints, respectively.
Therefore, the teachers expected utility in (19) can be expressed as the continuous func-
tion of the threshold types 0 and # only, which we denote by W :  (; )! R (the
domain of # is set to be an open set, which later is expanded to ). Let
~ = arg max
02[;]
W (0; #) = !(#);
which characterizes the teachers threshold type ~ of the optimal grade schedule r as a
function of the threshold # of the grading standard . Now, the grading standard 
is consistent if ~ = #, i.e., if # is a xed point of the solution function ! (we assume
the uniqueness of the solution for every #, which is though irrelevant for the following
analysis).
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By Berges Maximum Theorem, the solution function ! : (; ) !  is continuous
(because the function W is continuous and the constraint correspondence is compact-
valued and continuous: for any # the teachers choice set of 0 is the whole ability space
). The next step is to apply Brouwers Fixed Point Theorem, for which we need to
expand the domain of ! to . Dene a function ~! : !  by
~!() = lim! !();
~!() = !(); 8 2 (; );
~!() = lim! !().
The function ~! is continuous, its domain  is compact and convex, hence by Brouwers
Fixed Point Theorem it has a xed point fp
fp = ~!(fp);
which characterizes the consistent grading rule  with # = fp. Having said that, we
establish the following
Proposition 3 There exists a consistent grading standard .
4.3 Two-Type Example
Here, we illustrate the main results, obtained above, with a two-type example. Sup-
pose that with positive probabilities p1 and p2, p1 + p2 = 1, the students type  takes
values of 1 and 2, 0 < 1 < 2, respectively. Let the students e¤ort cost func-
tion be C(x; ) = x2=(2). The teacher looks for an incentive-compatible grading rule
fx; rg = f(x1; x2); (r1; r2)g, where score xi 2 [0; x] and grade ri 2 fr; rg, i = 1; 2, in order
to maximize the students expected e¤ort, which we denote by
V(x) = p1x1 + p2x2.
Let the students utility of a grade r be measured by the expected ability level inferred by
the job market. As before, we study two cases with observable and unobservable grading
rules.
First, consider the case when the job market observes the grading rule fx; rg applied
to grade the student (as in Subsection 4.1). If the teacher separates the types, i.e., we
have for the score-grade allocations (x1; r1) 6= (x2; r2), then in the optimal separating
grading rule fxs; rsg the grades are rs1 = r and rs2 = r and the scores are pinned down
from the individual rationality constraint of the low type and the incentive compatibility
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constraint of the high-type, yielding
xs1 =
q
221 and x
s
2 =
q
221 + 22(2   1):
If the teacher pools the types for a uniform allocation, then in the optimal pooling grading
rule fxp; rpg we have rp1 = rp2 = r and
xp1 = x
p
2 =
q
21^;
where ^ = p11 + p22 is the ability signal inferred by the job market under pooling.
The teacher separates if the expected score under fxs; rsg is larger than (or equal to)
that under fxp; rpg, i.e., if V(xs)  V(xp). To see that it is indeed the case, dene a
function g : R+ ! R+
g(a) =
q
221 + 2a(a  1);
where g(1) = xs1 and g(2) = x
s
2. Since the function g is convex, we have
V(xs) = p1xs1 + p2xs2 = p1g(1) + p2g(2)  g(^) =
q
221 + 2^(^   1) =
=
q
21 + ^
2
+ (^   1)2 >
q
21 + ^
2 
q
2^1 = x
p
1 = V(xp);
which says that the expected score under separation is greater than that under pooling.
In this example, as more generally shown in Proposition 2, when the job market observes
the grading rule applied to grade the student, the teacher sets up a grading rule that
distinguishes between the types (provided, the score schedule x is convex).
Next, consider the case when the market cannot observe the grading rule applied,
and suppose that it initially perceives that all the student types are being separated,
i.e, r1 = r and r2 = r. Under this circumstance, an individual teacher can costlessly
reward the student with any ability signal, 1 or 2. If the teacher separates the types
then the expected score level her student gets is as before:
V(xs) = p1
q
221 + p2
q
221 + 22(2   1):
If the teacher pools the types for the highest ability reward of 2, then the expected score
is equal to p
212:
Comparing the two expected-score expressions, we see that as p1 ! 1 (i.e., as the low
type becomes more likely) the pooling of types gives a higher expected score, while as
p1 ! 0 the separating of types does. By continuity, there is a threshold probability p
such that for p1 > p pooling types yields a higher expected score than separating, and
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vice versa (at p1 = p the two rules yield the same expected score).
Coming back to the discussion of consistent grading standards held by the job market,
for this two-type example we obtain that the separating grading rule is consistent when
p1 < p
.
Partial internalization
In this two-type setting, it is also feasible to discuss the situation, when a teacher partially
internalizes the e¤ect her grading rule has on the perception of grading standards held
by the market.
Suppose there are N teachers. If all the teachers set up the separating grading rule
fxs; rsg but one teacher, who pools the types for the highest grade, then the expected
ability that the job market perceives from seeing the highest grade is given by
~ =
1
N
^ +
N   1
N
2;
where ^ = p11 + p22. The rst term of the above expression is the e¤ect an individual
teachers deviation from the separating grading rule has on the job markets perception
of grading standards.
The separating grading rule is consistent if the expected e¤ort under pooling, which
is
p
21~, is less than V(xs) the expected e¤ort under separation. Suppose that for
some N teachers it is the case, but also let p1 > p from the previous subsection hold.
With more teachers arriving, i.e., with N increasing, the ability signal ~ tends to 2 as an
individual teachers grading practice has a vanishing impact on the market perception of
grades. Therefore, with p1 > p, there must be a threshold number of teachers N such
that for N > N the separating grading rule can no longer remain consistent.
It should also be noted that the pooling grading rule can be consistent for any N > 1,
i.e., if every teacher pools types, then an individual teacher may not nd it optimal to
separate types for its only partial e¤ect on the market perception of grades. Hence,
returning back to the analysis in the previous paragraph, the pooling grading rule can
also persist even when N goes back below N as no individual teacher wants to separate
the student types when everyone else pools them.
5 Discussion
Here, we discuss the main ndings of the model(s) presented. The focus lies on the model
with nominal grades of Section 3, which overlaps with the model with relative grades of
Section 4 when the job market does not observe exact grading rules. Arguably, the
scenario with unobservable grading rules is more widespread than that with observable
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grading rules, but at the same time the latter scenario serves as an important benchmark
for discussion on policy applications.
Signicantly, the grading patterns obtained here closely match those observed in prac-
tice lending credibility to our modeling framework of a teacher-student relationship. In
this light, we also argue that our model(s) can be used as microfoundations for policy
application purposes such as designing merit-pay programs for teachers.
Furthermore, if applied to job performance appraisal, the model with nominal grades
can also shed light on the leniency bias with implications to the compression of ratings
observed in the appraisal process.
5.1 Main Findings
Compression of grades and ratings
In general, the results obtained in this paper show that if there is a reason to think that
the principal does not pay for or internalize the cost of rewarding the agent, then in
attempt to elicit on average more e¤ort the principal chooses to be more lenient with
rewards than otherwise she would have been. In particular, the no pooling at the top
property, generally observed in models with costly transfers, does not hold here.
Referring to the teacher-student relationship studied, if an individual teacher cannot
credibly commit to her using the same grading standards the job market holds and the
job market cannot distinguish among individual grading rules applied, then we face the
situation when the teacher treats grades as costless rewards. As a result, the ubiquitous
compression of grades or leniency in grading can be the expectedknowledge-maximizing
outcome of the teachers optimal grading: it aims to extract more e¤ort from lower-ability
students with the help of costless good grades. To put it di¤erently, good grades are the
commonsthat teachers exploit to their benet. But as in any problem of the commons,
we inevitably obtain the deterioration of the commons, which, in our case, takes the form
of grade compression with implications to grade ination, discussed below.
Compressed rewards are characteristic not only to grading.13 The literature on job
performance appraisal has long dealt with the phenomenon of compression of ratings.
This phenomenon is about raters, e.g., managers, shallow di¤erentiation of good from
bad performance of their ratees, e.g., employees (Murphy & Cleveland (1995); also see
Prendergast (1999) for economistsaccount on the issue). Since performance ratings are
mostly used for salary administration purposes, a line manager can nd himself in the
position when he values his employeese¤ort but does not internalize the payroll cost
resulting from his ratings given. Hence, this manager-employee relationship falls within
our studied framework with costless rewards. As a result, the compression of ratings
13Johnson (1997) observes similarities of performance evaluation in academics, professional golf, airline
industry, and others.
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can be an optimal (employee-e¤ort-maximizing) outcome for a manager, which, however,
deserves a study of its own.
Mismatch between grades and abilities
Our results Result 2, in particular also o¤er an explanation why teachers of classes
with less able students are more lenient in grading than others (see, e.g., Goldman &
Widawski (1976)). As we argue, this can be an outcome of the optimal design of grading
rules and not necessarily an outcome of some teachersrent-seeking behavior, as some-
times is suggested (e.g., Johnson (1997)). Our model with nominal grades predicts that in
classes with less able students the optimal grading rules are designed so that high grades
are more easily attainable to elicit more e¤ort from more numerous lower-ability students,
resulting in a mismatch and low correlation between studentsgrades and their abilities.
For instance, if the population of mathematics students contains more talented people
than, say, the population of economics students, then we should observe stricter grad-
ing standards applied in mathematics classes and fewer good grades rewarded (as ample
empirical evidence shows to be the case, which is explored in the following section).
Concerning the normative side of the di¤erential grading standards discussed, there
have been a number of papers proposing grade adjustment mechanisms (see, e.g., Johnson
(1997)) in order to make grades more informative of studentsactual abilities. Without
going into the details of this literature, it is worth noting that there it is typically assumed
that the true reason for di¤erential grading standards lies with some personal features of
the instructor (e.g., the adaptation level, unwillingness to spend o¢ ce hours on dealing
with studentscomplaints about low grades, etc.). Therefore, proposed grade adjustment
mechanisms would attempt to correct for presumed instructor-specic factors failing to
recognize the possible endogeneity of those factors, which could lead a mechanism astray
from the projected goals.
Grade ination
From our model(s) studied, we can distinguish two factors contributing toward grade
ination. First, teachers become more lenient with grading in response to shifts in dis-
tribution for student abilities toward the lower end of the ability space (Result 2 of this
paper). Second, if an individual teacher nds that her grading practice does not a¤ect
the perception of the job market regarding the signaling value of grades, then the teacher
tends to overuse good grades (see Results 3 and 4).
The two factors can both originate from the same source, namely, the expanding
availability of education (see footnote 7 of this paper and, e.g., McKenzie & Tullock
(1981, Ch. 17)). Due to an increasing number of educational institutions and study
programs in recent decades, a larger number of study places has been o¤ered resulting in
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more lower-ability applicants being enrolled (see footnote 5). Subsequently, this can lead
to the emergence of the rst factor discussed. Similarly, with more issuers of educational
certicates, the grading rules applied by every issuer or teacher become less identiable,
resulting, correspondingly, in the emergence of the second factor.14
5.2 Policy Applications
The modeling framework presented can be used as microfoundations of a teacher-student
relationship to analyze the implications of the introduction of merit-pay programs for
teachers. In recent years, a number of such programs have been introduced in various
countries to foster incentives for teachers in their endeavors to motivate more e¤ort from
their students (see, Lavy (2002, 2009); Atkinson et al. (2004); Lazear (2003)). Typically,
these programs o¤er monetary bonuses to teachers if their students improve upon their
previous performance (as measured by their scores achieved on standardized tests). The
goals pursued by the developers of such programs social planners range from improv-
ing average performance (in most cases) to reducing the gap between poor and good
performers (as, e.g., in the No Child Left Behindinitiative in the US).
In terms of our modeling framework, the incentives for teachers set forth by merit-pay
programs can have a direct e¤ect on the form of the teachers utility function, V , in (1).
In the case of the No Child Left Behindprogram, where teachers are rewarded for a
reduction in the gap between poor and good performers, the utility function V could turn
concave since the teacher would start putting relatively more weight on the performance of
lower-ability students. Then, with a concave utility function V , the model with nominal
grades of Section 315 predicts that, compared with the case of linear utility, the gap
between low- and high-ability students would diminish. However, this reduction would
come from two directions, namely, from the teachers demanding more e¤ort from low-
ability students and demanding less e¤ort from high-ability students.16 Hence, according
14The expanding availability of education is discussed as a cause of the grade ination phenomenon
in McKenzie & Tullock (1981, Ch. 17). Their hypothesized link is in the context of the demand for and
supply of university openings: in response to a higher competition for students due to the increasing
number of university openings relative to the demand universities engaged in lowering grading standards
in order to attract more students. According to McKenzie & Tullock (1981), this practice eventually led
to grade ination.
15This model is perhaps more appropriate for modeling grading patterns in high schools, for ability-
signaling concerns should be of a lesser magnitude among high-school students.
16With a concave utility function V , the optimal score allocations ~x() for  in [; ) are equal to
~x() = y 1x

f()2Vx [~x()] yx [~x(
)]
f()2Vx [~x()]

:
First, it has to be the case for the highest score levels that ~x() < x(), where x() is the pooling-
interval score level in the linear-utility case. This is so because the ratio Vx [~x()] =Vx [~x(
)] for  < 
is strictly greater than 1 and if ~x()  x() then the whole score allocation schedule ~x is above the
allocation schedule x of the linear case. But it is not possible because ~x would be the solution to the
teachers problem in the linear case, not x. Next, the ratio (Vx [~x()] yx [~x(
)])=Vx [~x()] needs to be
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to the model, a negative externality from the introduction of this program can arise: high-
ability students can be made get the same grades but for less e¤ort. On the contrary, the
gap between poor and good performers increases if the teachers utility function turns
convex as a result, for instance, of the social planner implementing a merit-pay program
that rewards for studentsexcellence only.
With the help our model(s), we can also o¤er an insight into the problem whether the
university administration should restrict the teacherschoice of grading rules by imposing
relative grading, i.e., grading on a curve. From the perspective of our model with relative
grades, when the job market observes the grading rule applied by the teacher, an optimal
grading rule is, actually, the one that perfectly screens student types. Then, imposing
grading on a curve is superuous since it does not bind. However, when the job market
does not observe grading rules, the teacher faces a commitment problem of not overusing
good grades, as we discussed before. In this event, grading on a curve would actually
bind and could possibly x the teachers commitment problem. But then, the question
is what goals the university administration pursues. If they coincide with the teachers,
i.e., maximizing student knowledge, then grading on a curve would be a desirable policy.
But if the administration aims to maximize the expected wage of its students, assuming
it is proportional to the ability signal inferred by the market, then the administration
may want, as argued in Chan et al. (2007) and Ostrovsky & Schwarz (2010), to refrain
from imposing grading on a curve and rather have grades compressed in order to disclose
information about student abilities only coarsely.17
6 Empirical Evidence
Here we present empirical evidence in support of our Result 2 the lower the expectations
the teacher holds about her studentsabilities, the more lenient the grading rule she sets
up.
In general, to test this theoretical prediction of the model, one would need university
data such as student grades and their ability proxy (like their performance on university
entry exams or Scholastic Aptitude Test [SAT] scores). Then, roughly speaking, one
would compare grading patterns for classes with di¤erent student ability distributions
and see if the prediction holds. However, there have been a number of empirical studies
of the kind in the special literature of educational measurement (e.g., in academic period-
icals such as the Journal of Educational Measurement or Educational and Psychological
Measurement). Most importantly, those studies without exception report results that are
greater than yx [x(
)] at least for some  in [; ), otherwise the score schedule in the linear case would
do better than ~x. Hence, if for some  ~x() > x() so it is for  = . Therefore, we obtain a reduction
in the gap between the highest and lowest performances, but this reduction comes from both directions.
17For more discussion on and empirical implications of making academic transcripts more informative,
see Bar et al. (2009).
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fully in line with the models predictions: elds with lower ability students studied as
compared with those with higher ability students employ less stringent grading criteria.
Even though many of those studies are comprehensive in empirical matters, they lack
any rigorous theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. Their explanations mainly
hinge on intuition or reference to similar phenomena from the adaptation-level theory
in psychological literature. In what follows, we attempt to review in detail some of the
empirical studies comparing grading standards over time and in di¤erent elds, and to
show that our model proves helpful in explaining the empirical evidence observed.
Aiken (1963) is one of the rst empirical studies that suggest that grading behavior is
dictated by the quality of students in the current class and not by some absolute invariant
standards. Aiken (1963) presents time-series evidence from the Womans College of the
University of North Carolina that could imply that, with more able students in a class
(as measured by their SAT scores and high-school rankings), teachers tend to apply
more stringent grading standards. As for the theoretical explanation for this nding, the
study only briey mentions that it conforms to the adaptation-level theory or central
tendency phenomenon, which basically concerns the tendency of supervisors to evaluate
the performance of people supervised in relative terms rather than in absolute ones.
A much more comprehensive study Goldman &Widawski (1976) rst notes the weak-
nesses of previous studies on grading patterns because of their using the total grade point
average (GPA) as the criterion of grading standards. As they rightly argue, GPAs are not
perfectly comparable either over time or among individual students because of the possi-
bly di¤erent composition of courses included to compute grade averages. To remedy that,
Goldman & Widawski (1976) employ a between-subjects design aimed at making grade
comparisons more e¤ective. They compute an index of grading standards using pairwise
comparisons of grades in 17 major elds at the University of California, Riverside, from
a random sample of 475 students. In particular, they perform the comparison of grading
standards in one class (say, psychology) against those in another class (say, biology) by
computing the di¤erence in average grades of only those students who took both classes.
After obtaining di¤erentials in grading standards between any two classes (from the 17
classes available in their study), they construct an index of grading standards for each
class, which is an average of all the di¤erentials between that particular class and the rest
of the classes. Finally, they correlate the computed indices of grading standards with the
average scores on the verbal and mathematical portions of the SAT test and high-school
GPAs (i.e., student ability proxies) of all the students majoring in those 17 classes. The
main empirical nding in Goldman & Widawski (1976) is that the constructed index of
grading standards correlates highly in a negative direction with student ability proxies.
In other words, they conclude that professors in a eld containing more able students
tend to grade more stringently than do professors in elds with lower ability students.
As a result, they nd that the past performance and abilities of students account for
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only slightly more than 50 percent of the variance in grades, and suggest introducing
some grade adjustment mechanism to make grades more informative of students true
abilities. Again, in giving an explanation for the empirical results obtained, they restrict
their argument simply by making a reference to the adaptation-level theory that people
are judged in comparison to their peers.
A similar study Goldman & Hewitt (1975), which along with presenting the empir-
ical results (which draw the same conclusions about grading behavior as in the studies
mentioned above), also provides a more elaborate theoretical explanation for the results
obtained. The authors think that the antecedents (e.g., student ability levels, work
habits, etc.) and consequences (grading standards) of college grading are inextricably
tied together by a personal characteristic of college instructors. This characteristic is
the phenomenon of adaptation level, and it is so pervasive among college instructors and
perhaps people in general, Goldman & Hewitt (1975) continue, as to be considered an al-
most inevitable factor in the college grading process. Consequently, through that personal
characteristic link, grading standards would be partly determined by the ability level of
the student population. However, along the lines of our model developed above, this
personal characteristic, as envisaged by Goldman & Hewitt (1975), is not some intrinsic
feature of human behavior but rather the outcome of optimal behavior.
A decade later, Strenta & Elliott (1987) replicated the study of Goldman &Widawski
(1976) using data from a di¤erent institution, Dartmouth College, just to nd that the
di¤erential grading standards exist in the same magnitude and in roughly the same or-
der. Therefore, Strenta & Elliott (1987) argue that it remains the case that students
with higher SAT scores tend to major in elds with more rigorous grading standards,
and that factors attracting more talented students result in their being graded harder.
(However, we would argue for the reverse direction of causation: since some elds attract
more talented students, professors in those elds will grade their students more strin-
gently, which is optimal in order to extract more e¤ort.) As in previous studies, Strenta
& Elliott (1987) argue that these di¤erential grading standards serve to attenuate the
correlation between the GPAs and SAT scores of the students, and they also show that
the correlation increases sizably if GPAs are adjusted by accounting for di¤erences in
departmental grading standards. Finally, a similar study conducted at Duke Univer-
sity (Johnson (2003)) conrmed the conclusions about systematic di¤erences in grading
standards from the previous studies.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a teacher-student relationship as a special type of an agency
problem featuring costless rewards. Our theoretical predictions o¤er a good match to
grading patterns empirically observed both from the static and dynamic perspectives.
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This allows us to suggest that the chosen modeling framework is appropriate to analyze
a teacher-student relationship.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Here, we solve the teachers utility maximization problem (3)(6), namely, we look for
the grading rule fx; rg 2 C1x  C1r that maximizes (3) subject to (4)(6).
As it is standard for this type of problems, we start with reducing the maximization
problem by singling out the set of constraints that bind in the optimum. First, assuming,
for convenience, that the teacher never nds it optimal to set a zero allocation for any
student type, in the optimum the individual rationality constraint of the lowest type is
binding
U(; ) = 0:
Second, the set of adjacent incentive-compatibility constraints needs to be downward
binding, from which the students utility levels for types  2 (; ] in the teachers opti-
mum are equal to
U(; ) =  
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~: (23)
When the above constraints hold and we have a monotonously increasing score schedule
x (which is a necessary condition for incentive compatibility), then, by the single crossing
property the rest of constraints will also hold.
Next, we observe that since grades are costless for the teacher to reward, in the
optimum it must be that the highest ability type gets the highest grade, i.e., r() = r.
Then, we make the following conjecture.
Conjecture A.1 In the solution to (3)(6), r() = r only for  = .
To put it di¤erently, we conjecture that there is no pooling of types at the top. Now,
from (23) for  =  we get
r   C(x();) +
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~ = 0; (24)
which combines all the constraints into one and eliminates the grade schedule from the
maximization problem (if (24) is satised, so are all the other constraints by choosing the
rightgrade schedule).
Next, we set up the Lagrangean of the reduced maximization problem:
L(x; ) =
Z 

x()f()d() + [r   C(x();) +
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~]:
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The rst-order conditions (FOCs) are
f() + [ Cx(x();) + Cx(x();)] = 0 (25)
with respect to allocation x(), and
f() + Cx(x();) = 0: (26)
with respect to allocations x();  2 [; ). These FOCs together with reduced constraint
(24) characterize the optimal score schedule x provided Conjecture A.1 holds.
Combining through the Lagrange multiplier  the rst-order condition (25) with (26),
we get
f()
f()
=
Cx(x();)  Cx(x();)
 Cx(x();) ;
which should hold for any type . But if we take the limit  !  on both sides, we nd
that the left-hand side converges to 1, while the right-hand side  to something strictly
greater than one:
Cx(x();)
 Cx(lim! x();)
+
Cx(x();)
Cx(lim! x();)
 Cx(x();) Cx(lim! x();)
+ 1 > 1:
Hence, there cannot exist a monotonous score schedule x that satises the rst-order
conditions and constraint (24). In other words, there is no shadow price  that can
balance all the incentives and screen types at the top. Therefore, Conjecture A1 does not
hold implying that there must be some pooling of types for the highest reward.
Therefore, we proceed by pooling types  which are subject to the uniform allocation
with the highest grade of r. Let  denote the starting value of the pooling interval [; ],
and the constraint equivalent to (24) becomes
r   C(x();) +
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~ = 0: (27)
The Lagrangean now takes the form of
L(x; ) =
Z 

x()f()d() + (1  F ())x() + [r  C(x();) +
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~]:
The FOCs are
f() + (1  F ()) + ( Cx(x();) + Cx(x();)) = 0 (28)
32
with respect to allocation x(), and, as before,
f() + Cx(x();) = 0 (29)
with respect to allocations x();  2 [; ). Combining the two conditions, we get
f() + (1  F ())
f()
=
Cx(x(
);)  Cx(x();)
 Cx(x();) :
Before deriving the condition for the starting point of the pooling interval , we make
the following observation. In the solution, the score schedule x needs to be continuous
at the starting point of the pooling interval. If it were not, then the reward schedule r
would also be discontinuous (otherwise, the grading rule would not be incentive compat-
ible). But since grades are costless for the teacher, then at no cost she can improve her
utility by tilting up the segment of score allocations to the left from the discontinuity
point and accordingly adjusting the grade allocations to meet the incentive compatibility
constraints. Hence, the score schedule x cannot be discontinuous at the starting point of
the pooling interval.18
Taking the limit  !  on both sides and using the continuity of x at  we get the
condition for the starting point of the pooling interval [; ] :
1  F ()
f()
=
Cx(x(
);)
 Cx(x();) ;
or, given the functional assumption that the e¤ort cost function C is separable in score
and type, C(x; ) = y(x)=, this condition becomes
1  F ()
f()
= : (30)
Since there may be no type  in

; 

for which condition (30) holds19, then the starting
value of the pooling at the topinterval is dened as
 = minf : (1  F ())=(f())  1;  2 g; (31)
which is (7) in Proposition 1. Note that the expression (1 F ())=(f()) is monotonically
decreasing in  due to the monotone hazard rate assumption so that the pooling-interval
starting point  is uniquely determined.
Suppose that  > . Denote the score-grade allocation for every type  in

; 

by
18The argument given also depends on the fact that the score allocations to the left from  are strictly
monotonous, which immediately follows from the monotone hazard rate condition and the observation
that f() < 1  F () for  2 [; ) following from the pooling-interval condition.
19The pooling interval comprises the whole type space if, for instance, student types  are uniformly
distributed with   =2.
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(x(); r), where the score allocation x() needs still to be determined. From (28) and
(30) we express the Lagrange multiplier  to be equal to
 =
f()2
yx(x(
))
: (32)
Plugging the above expression for  into remaining rst-order conditions (29), we get
that for every  in [; ) the optimal score allocation x() is equal to
x() = y 1x

f()2yx(x(
))
f()2

; (33)
which is (8) in Proposition 1.
Finally, the highest score allocation, x(), can be determined from the constraint
r   C(x(); ) +
Z 

C(x(); )d = 0; (34)
after plugging in the expression for x() from (33), giving (10) in Proposition 2.
The constraint that the score schedule x be non-decreasing is met, which follows from
(30) and the monotone hazard rate assumption.20
The optimal grade allocations r() for  in [; ) are found from (23) and are equal
to
r() = C(x(); ) 
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~; (35)
which is (9) in Proposition 1, concluding the solution to the optimization problem (3)(6).
Appendix B. Proof of Result 2
With reference to the pooling-interval condition (7), dene gi() = (1   Fi())=(fi()),
then, the starting points of the pooling intervals are i = minf : gi()  1;  2 g,
i = 1; 2. Since the likelihood ratio order implies the hazard rate order (see Shaked
& Shanthikumar (1994)), which is f1()=(1   F1())  f2()(1   F2()) for every , it
immediately follows that g1()  g2(), leading to 1  2. Hence, we have r2() = r 
r1() for  2

2; 

.
Next, consider the optimal score allocations xi(), i = 1; 2, for types  in [; 

2).
Denote the Lagrange multipliers from the two optimization problems by 1 and 2, dened
by (32) of Appendix A, respectively. Divide the rst-order conditions for x1 and x2 in
20From equation (30) it follows that f()=(1   F ()) < 1 for  in [; ), and from the monotone
hazard rate: f 0() >  f2()=(1   F ()). The two properties ensure that the derivative of (33), @x=@,
is positive.
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(29) of Appendix A to obtain for any  in [; 2)
yx(x2())
yx(x1())
=
1
2
f2()
f1()
;
which also holds at  = 2 by the continuity of the score schedule x2 at  = 

2 as argued
in Appendix A.
Since the highest score x2(

2) in the second (less able) class must be at least as large
as x1(

2), which stems from the second teachers incentive to expand the pooling interval
even further (otherwise the score schedule x2 could be improved upon by tilting it up),
then at  = 2 the left-hand side of the above expression is greater than or equal to 1, and
so is the right-hand side. Due to the decreasing likelihood ratio f2()=f1(), the right-
hand side stays greater than 1 for any  in [; 2), and so does the left-hand side, implying
that x2()  x1() for every  in [; 2), which subsequently leads to r2()  r1() from
(9) in Proposition 1.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
Dene the teachers expected utility V : C1x ! R from implementing a score schedule x
by
V(x) =
Z 

x()f()d:
Let the score schedule x with the grade schedule r imposed by (16) solve the teachers
problem (13)(15) and suppose that there is a non-empty pooling interval [0; 00] at which
x() = x0 and r() = r0 (the arguments below are also valid if we consider a half-open
or open pooling interval). We need to consider two cases 1) 0 =  and 2) 0 > . In
each case it is su¢ cient to restrict attention to those score allocations that satisfy the
optimality conditions: the binding individual rationality constraint of the lowest-ability
type and the set of downward-binding incentive compatibility constraints, respectively.
In the rst case, 1) 0 = , the score allocation x() = x0 with grade r0 for all 
in [; 00] need to satisfy the binding individual rationality constraint of the lowest-ability
type:
r(r0)  y(x
0)

= 0;
or
x0 = y 1[r(r0)];
where the function y 1 is the inverse of y and r is the ability type inferred as given by
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(11). The teachers expected utility from implementing the score schedule x is given by
V(x) = F (00)y 1[r(r0)] +
Z 
00
x()f()d:
As an alternative to the score schedule x, consider the following score schedule x^ :
for  in [; 00] set (distinct and incentive compatible) performance allocations x^() =
y 1[(2 + 2)=2], as in (17), and for  in (00; ]  x^() = x(). The case of interest is
the situation when the monotonicity of the new score schedule x^ is preserved. Otherwise,
when the monotonicity not preserved, i.e., if x^(00) > x^() = x() for some  > 00, the
teacher can increase her expected utility by simply setting x^() = x^(00) for all  > 00
such that x^() < x^(00) and leave the remaining allocations intact. The teachers expected
utility from implementing the score schedule x^ is equal to
V(x^) =
Z 00

x^()f()d +
Z 
00
x()f()d:
The second terms of V(x) and V(x^) are identical, and so any di¤erence in the utilities
needs to come from the di¤erence in the rst terms. Since the new performance allocation
schedule x^ is convex on the restriction [; 00] the condition of Proposition 2 then by
Jensens inequalityZ 00

x^()f()d()  F (00)x^(
Z 00

f()d()=F (00)) = F (00)x^(r(r0))
= F (00)y 1[(r(r0)2 + 2)=2] > F (00)y 1(r(r0));
which is equal to the rst term of V(x), and where the last inequality stems from the
fact that the arithmetic average is greater than the geometric one and y 1 is strictly
increasing.
Hence, instead of pooling ability types at the bottom the teacher can do better by
screening them since V(x^) > V(x).
In the second case, 0 > , the allocation x() = x0 for all  in [0; 00] together
with grade r0 need to satisfy the downward binding incentive compatibility constraint of
the ability type 0, which can be expressed as
r(r0)  y(x
0)
0
= r(r00)  y(x
00)
0
;
where the allocation (x00; r00) is the best alternative to type 0. Since the teacher screens the
types in [; 0) and the optimal way of doing it is as in (17) otherwise, the score schedule
x is not optimal then the score allocation x00 = sup<0 x
() = y 1[(02+2)=2] and the
ability signal r(r00) = sup<0  = 
0. The optimal score allocation x0 can, accordingly,
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be expressed as
x0 = y 1

0r(r0)  
02   2
2

;
and the resulting expected utility to the teacher from implementing the grading rule x
is equal to
V(x) =
Z 0

x()f()d + (F (00)  F (0))x0 +
Z 
00
x()f()d:
Similarly to the previous case, consider the following grading rule x^ : for  in [0; 00] set
performance allocations x^() = y 1[(2+2)=2] and for  in [; 0)[(00; ]  x^() = x().
(The monotonicity of the grading rule x^ is preserved on the restriction [; 00] by the
construction of x^() for  in [0; 00], and regarding the monotonicity over (00; ] the same
argument as in the rst case studied above applies.) The teachers expected utility from
implementing x^ is equal to
V(x^) =
Z 0

x()f()d +
Z 00
0
x^()dF () +
Z 
00
x()f()d:
Given the condition that x^() is convex for  in [0; 00], by Jensens inequality we have
for the second term of V(x^) thatZ 00
0
x^()dF ()  (F (00)  F (0))x^(r(r0)) =
= (F (00)  F (0))y 1[(r(r0)2 + 2)=2] >
> (F (00)  F (0))y 1[0r(r0)  (02   2)=2];
which is the second term of V(x), and where the last inequality stems from the fact
that r(r0) > 0 and y 1 is strictly increasing. From this derivation, we have again that
V(x^) > V(x), which concludes the proof of Proposition 2 that pooling student types
cannot be optimal for the teacher when the score allocation x in (17) is convex.
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